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The new mechanism under Article 6.4 of the 
Paris Agreement is to be supervised by a body 
designated by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement (CMA). However, so far there is 
no clarity what role exactly the supervisory 
body (Body) is to play.
The paper first reflects the objectives of the 
new mechanism and on what the role of the 
mechanism as a whole should be, especially in
comparison to the two other approaches 
established under Article 6, cooperative 
approaches and non-market approaches. The 
paper then summarises what has already been 
agreed on the functioning of the mechanism in
the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 and 
elaborates what steps will be needed to
generate transferrable emission reductions 
under the Article 6.4 mechanism. On this basis,
the paper develops criteria for how to decide 
what role the Body should have, and then 
discusses what role the Body and the other 
actors that are involved in the mechanism
could have in each of the steps of the activity 
cycle. 
The paper considers the functions DOE 
accreditation, development and approval of 
methodologies, authorisation and registration 
of activities, issuance of emission reductions,
promotion of an equitable geographical
distribution of activities, strategic review of the 
mechanism’s operation, and registry 
maintenance. Going through the functions 
reveals that except for their role in maintaining 
the registry, the role of the Body and its support 
structure is generally not yet clear. By contrast,
the roles of Parties and DOEs are already 
relatively well-defined. No responsibility 
whatsoever has so far been assigned for the 
functions DOE accreditation, methodology 
development/approval, geographical
distribution and strategic review.
On this basis, the Body may be assigned vastly 
different roles:
• It could merely be a notary, with the
operation of the mechanism being left
to Parties.
• It could be a supervisor of Parties’
operations
• It could act as guardian, undertaking
the operation of the mechanism by
itself.
• Or it could be a promoter, not just
operating the mechanism but taking
active action to shape use of the
mechanism by Party and non-Party
actors.
The paper elaborates how the role of the Body 
could be defined in each of these models and 
considers pros and cons of each model on the 
basis of the following criteria: 
• Achievement of the overarching





• Facilitation of participation for
countries with low capacity;
• Administrative feasibility and
transaction costs.
The following table illustrates the assignment 
of functions to the four models. One ‘+’ denotes 
a minor role whereas three ‘+’ denote a major 
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models. Functions could also be combined 
differently.
While weighing the different criteria that speak 
in favour of the different models includes a 
degree of subjectivity, the authors consider that 
achievement of the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement should be the paramount criterion.
The history of in particular JI Track 1 has shown 
that environmental integrity may be breached 
severely without international oversight. From
this perspective, the ‘notary’ model seems out 
of the question. 
Weighing the ‘guardian’ and the ‘supervisor’
models, the integrity of DOEs and the reliability 
and transparency of methodologies are 
particularly central pillars of maintaining
environmental integrity. If DOE accreditation 
and methodology approval are centralised 
under the Body, one might consider dispensing 
with having the Body assess individual activity 
proposals and issuances.
While the ‘notary’, ‘guardian’ and ‘supervisor’
roles are mutually exclusive, the ‘promoter’ is 
rather a complementary role which could be 
added to any other role. For example, even if 
the Body is only made a ‘notary’ in the 
operation of the activity cycle, it might still be
given the task to develop methodologies or to 
promote equitable geographical distribution of 
activities. 
Whatever role is chosen, the history of the 
Kyoto mechanisms shows that regular review of 
the operation of the new mechanism will be
crucial to safeguard its contribution to the Paris 
objectives. In addition to regular reflection by 
the Body and the CMA, implementation of the 
Article 6.4 mechanism could also be examined 
under the Global Stocktake.
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1 Introduction  
Art. 6.1 of the Paris Agreement recognizes “that 
some Parties choose to pursue voluntary 
cooperation in the implementation of their 
nationally determined contributions to allow 
for higher ambition in their mitigation and 
adaptation actions and to promote sustainable 
development and environmental integrity.”
Art. 6 subsequently establishes three 
approaches for countries to cooperate with 
each other:
• First, Art. 6.2 and 6.3 provides the
option for Parties to directly engage in
“cooperative approaches” and to use
“internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes” (ITMOs) in achieving their
nationally determined contributions
(NDCs). International supervision of
these cooperative activities is not
foreseen, there is to be only guidance
for Parties that want to engage in
cooperative approaches.
• Second, Art. 6.4-6.7 establishes a new
mechanism “to contribute to the
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions
and support sustainable development”.
In contrast to the cooperative 
approaches, this mechanism will be
supervised by a body designated by the
Conference of the Parties serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Paris
Agreement (CMA). In addition, the
Parties are to adopt rules, modalities
and procedures (RMP) which must be
observed when implementing activities
under Article 6.4.
• Third, Art. 6.8 and 6.9 provides for the
use of non-market approaches. Just
how these approaches are to work will
be determined in the coming years with
the development of a “framework for 
non-market approaches”. 
This paper focuses on the governance of the 
Article 6.4 mechanism. In particular, so far there 
is no clarity what role exactly the supervisory 
body (Body) is to play. While the Paris 
Agreement and the decision adopting the 
agreement (Decision 1/CP.21) delineate to 
some extent what role Parties should play and 
also envisage a role for Designated Operational 
Entities (i.e. independent third-party auditors),
there are no detailed provisions for the work of 
the Body. The role and functions of the Body 
are therefore among the key topics to be 
resolved at the 2018 CMA in Katowice.
This paper aims to develop options in this
regard. The paper first reflects the objectives of 
the new mechanism and on what the role of 
the mechanism as a whole should be, especially
in comparison to the two other approaches 
established under Article 6, cooperative 
approaches and non-market approaches. The 
paper then summarises what has already been 
agreed on the functioning of the mechanism in
the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 and 
elaborates what steps will be needed to
generate transferrable emission reductions 
under the Article 6.4 mechanism. On this basis,
the paper develops criteria for how to decide 
what role the Body should have, and then 
discusses what role the Body and the other 
actors that are involved in the mechanism
could have in each of the steps of the activity 
cycle. 
Several prototypical models can be envisaged 
from the role of the Body:
• It could merely be a notary, with the










• It could be a supervisor of Parties’
operations
• It could act as guardian, undertaking
the operation of the mechanism by
itself.
• Or it could be a promoter, not just
operating the mechanism but taking
active action to shape use of the
mechanism by Party and non-Party
actors.
The paper will elaborate how the role of the 
Body could be defined in each of these models,
consider pros and cons of each model and 
ultimately develop recommendations on how 
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2 Operational Details of the 
Article 6.4 Mechanism
 Objectives of the Mechanism
The Article 6.4 mechanism is to serve different 
objectives. These can be derived from Article 
6.4 itself and from Article 6.1, which serves as a 
chapeau for all Article 6 activities. Building on
these two paragraphs, the following five 
objectives can be discerned.
Promote climate change mitigation 
• Promote environmental integrity (Art. 6.1);
• Promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions (Art. 6.4 (a));
• Deliver an overall mitigation in global
emissions. (Art 6.4 (d)).
Assist Parties’ NDC implementation  
• Allow Parties to cooperate in the 
implementation of their NDCs (Art. 6.1);
• To contribute to the reduction of emission
levels in the host Party, which will benefit
from mitigation activities resulting in
emission reductions that can also be used
by another Party to fulfil its nationally
determined contribution (Art. 6.4 (c)).
Allow for higher ambition 
• Allow for higher ambition of Parties’
mitigation and adaptation actions (Art. 6.1).
Promote sustainable development 
• Promote (Art. 6.1) and foster (Art. 6.4)
sustainable development.
Incentivize public and private entities 
• Incentivize and facilitate the participation of
public and private entities (Art. 6.4 (b)).
 otential Roles of the Article
6.4 Mechanism and its
Supervisory Body
A key question for the governance of Article 6.4 
is what role the mechanism as such should 
have. A main aspect here is what is the 
distinction between the mechanism and the 
other two approaches for cooperation 
established under Article 6?  
According to the Paris Agreement, the Article 
6.4 mechanism is to generate emission 
reductions that can be used by Parties other 
than the originating Party to fulfil their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
The role of the mechanism can thereby easily 
be distinguished from the non-market 
approaches provided for in Article 6.8-6.9,
which will not generate transferrable emission
reductions.
However, the distinction between the new 
mechanisms and the “cooperative approaches” 
provided for in Article 6.2 is not so clear. Both,
“cooperative approaches” and the Article 6.4 
mechanism, have the function to allow 
recipient Parties the use of emission reductions 
achieved on the territory of other Parties. 
The key distinction of the two approaches is
their governance. International supervision of 
“cooperative approaches” is not foreseen, only 
































W olf g a n g O b er g a s s el 
t o  e n g a g e  i n  c o o p er ati v e  a p pr o a c h e s.  B y  
c o ntr a st,  t h e  Arti cl e  6. 4  m e c h a ni s m  i s  t o  b e  
g o v er n e d  i nt er n ati o n all y,  o n  t h e  b a si s  of  R M P  
a d o pt e d  b y  t h e  P arti e s  a n d  s u p er vi s e d  b y  a  
b o d y m a n d at e d b y t h e P arti e s. 
S o m e  s u b mi s si o n s  h a v e  t h er ef or e  pr o p o s e d  
t h at Arti cl e 6. 4 i s e s p e ci all y f or l e s s d e v el o p e d 
P arti e s  t h at  d o  n ot  h a v e  t h e  c a p a cit y  t o  
p arti ci p at e  i n  Arti cl e  6. 2.  I n  t hi s  vi si o n,  Arti cl e  
6. 2  w o ul d  b e  t h e  s p a c e  f or  l ar g e- s c al e  
c o o p er ati o n b et w e e n P arti e s wit h hi g h l e v el s of 
t e c h ni c al  c a p a cit y,  e. g.  t hr o u g h  li n ki n g  of  
e mi s si o n s tr a di n g s c h e m e s or c o o p er ati o n wit h 
r e s p e ct  t o  t h e  i m pl e m e nt ati o n  l ar g e- s c al e  
pr o gr a m m e s  or  p oli ci e s.  Arti cl e  6. 4,  i n  t ur n,
w o ul d b e t h e s p a c e f or P arti e s t h at d o n ot h a v e 
t h e c a p a cit y t o e st a bli s h a n d pr o p erl y a c c o u nt 
f or  s u c h  l ar g e- s c al e  c o o p er ati o n  ( O b er g a s s el  
2 0 1 6). 
F urt h er di s c u s si o n s r e v ol v e ar o u n d t h e i s s u e of 
w h at  r ol e  t h e  B o d y  s h o ul d  h a v e  i n si d e  t h e  
m e c h a ni s m. T h e c urr e nt n e g oti ati n g d o c u m e nt 
( U N F C C C 2 0 1 8) e n vi s a g e s t w o c or e o pti o n s: 
• 	    " c e ntr ali s e d s y st e m " w h er e t h e B o d y h a s a
str o n g r e g ul at or y a n d a p pr o v al f u n cti o n;	
• 	    " h o st P art-l e d s y st e m " w h er e P arti e s d o
m o st t hi n g s o n t h eir o w n  
T h e d o c u m e nt al s o e n vi s a g e s a “ d u al s y st e m”, 
w h er e  t h e  m e c h a ni s m  w o ul d  b e  o p er at e d  b y  
t h e  P arti e s  a n d  t h e  B o d y  w o ul d  a s s e s s  t h eir  
n ati o n al  pr o c e s s e s  r at h er  t h a n  i n di vi d u al  
miti g ati o n a cti viti e s. 
   u 		e nt St at u s of t h e
N e g oti ati o n s o n t h e
O p er ati o n of t h e M e c h a ni s m 
B ef or e  di s c u s si n g  t h e  g o v er n a n c e  of  t h e  n e w  
m e c h a ni s m i n d et ail, it i s n e c e s s ar y t o e st a bli s h 
h o w  t h e  m e c h a ni s m  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  o p er at e.  
T h e  P ari s  A gr e e m e nt  a n d  t h e  d e ci si o n  b y  t h e  
C o nf er e n c e  of  t h e  P arti e s  a d o pti n g  t h e  
A gr e e m e nt ( D e ci si o n 1/ C P. 2 1) c o nt ai n o nl y f e w 
el e m e nt s i n t hi s r e g ar d: 
• T h e  m e c h a ni s m  i s  e st a bli s h e d  u n d er  t h e
a ut h orit y a n d g ui d a n c e of t h e C M A ( Art. 6. 4
P A).
• T h e  m e c h a ni s m  s h all  b e  s u p er vi s e d  b y  a
b o d y d e si g n at e d b y t h e C M A ( Art. 6. 4 P A).
• E mi s si o n  r e d u cti o n s  r e s ulti n g  fr o m  t h e
m e c h a ni s m  s h all  n ot  b e  u s e d  t o
d e m o n str at e  a c hi e v e m e nt  of  t h e  h o st
P art y’ s  N D C  if  u s e d  b y  a n ot h er  P art y  t o
d e m o n str at e  a c hi e v e m e nt  of  it s  N D C  ( Art.
6. 5  P A).  T h at  i s,  t h er e  i s  t o  b e  n o  d o u bl e
c o u nti n g.
• U s e  of  t h e  m e c h a ni s m  b y  P arti e s  i s
v ol u nt ar y ( Art. 6. 4 P A).
• E mi s si o n  r e d u cti o n s  r e s ulti n g  fr o m
miti g ati o n a cti viti e s n e e d t o b e v erifi e d a n d
c ertifi e d b y d e si g n at e d o p er ati o n al e ntiti e s
( D O E s) ( D e ci si o n 1/ C P. 2 1 p ar a 3 7 ( d).
A c c or di n g  t o  t h e  c urr e nt  n e g oti ati n g  t e xt  
( U N F C C C 2 0 1 8) a miti g ati o n a cti vit y will n e e d t o 
c o m pl et e  t h e  f oll o wi n g  st e p s  i n  or d er  t o  b e  
r e gi st er e d  a n d  a bl e  t o  g e n er at e  tr a n sf err a bl e  
e mi s si o n r e d u cti o n s. 
1. D e si g n:  T hi s  will  b e  t h e  t a s k  of  a cti vit y
pr o p o n e nt s;  c or e  el e m e nt s  ar e  t h e
d e s cri pti o n  of  t h e  pr o p o s e d  a cti vit y,  t h e
d e m o n str ati o n  of  a d diti o n alit y,  t h e
e st a bli s h m e nt of a b a s eli n e s c e n ari o a n d a n
a cti vit y  s c e n ari o  t o  c al c ul at e  t h e  e x p e ct e d
e mi s si o n r e d u cti o n, a n d a m o nit ori n g pl a n.
T h e  q u e sti o n  i s  w h et h er  t h e  B o d y  will  b e
gi v e n  t h e  m a n d at e  t o  d e v el o p/ a p pr o v e
r e s p e cti v e t e m pl at e s a n d m et h o d ol o gi e s.
2. A ut h ori s ati o n:  T h e  pr o p o s al  will  n e e d  t o
b e a ut h ori s e d b y a p arti ci p ati n g P art y.
3. V ali d ati o n:  T h e  pr o p o s al  will  pr o b a bl y
n e e d  t o  b e  v ali d at e d  b y  a  D O E.  If  t h e
v ali d ati o n  h a s  a  p o siti v e  r e s ult,  t h e  D O E
s u b mit s  t h e  pr o p o s al  f or  a p pr o v al  a n d
r e gi str ati o n.
4. R e gi str ati o n:  T h e  a cti vit y  will  n e e d  t o  b e
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whether or not the Body will be given the 
authority to review and if necessary reject 
proposals.
5. Implementation and monitoring: The
proponents implement the activity and will
need to monitor the implementation and
the emission reductions that are achieved.
6. Verification and certification: The 
monitoring will need to be verified and
certified by a DOE. The DOE will then
request issuance of A6.4 emission 
reductions.
7. Issuance: Units will be issued based on the
reductions achieved. The question is
whether or not Parties and/or the Body will
be given the authority to review and if
necessary reject issuance requests.
8. Forwarding/transfer of units: Units will be
forwarded/transferred out of the 
mechanism registry in accordance with the
instructions of the activity participants.
Based on the above, implementation of Article 
6.4 activities will as a minimum involve the 
following actors:






• Potentially further support bodies under
the Body.
On the basis of the activity cycle, the following 
core functions will need to be performed to 
operate the mechanism:
• Development, standardization and 
approval of methodologies;
• Accreditation of DOEs;
• Authorisation and registration of activities;
• Monitoring of and reporting on activities
and subsequent issuance of units;
• Registry development and maintenance.
In addition, a key function is arguably to ensure 
and periodically review whether the 
mechanism contributes to the purpose of the 
Paris Agreement. Critics argue that the Kyoto 
mechanisms may actually have increased 
global emissions by issuing credits for emission 
reductions that were actually not additional
(Cames et al. 2016; Kollmuss, Schneider, and 
Zhezherin 2015). The objective of Article 6 goes 
even further than the objective of the Kyoto 
mechanisms. It is not just to facilitate 
compliance but to help increase ambition and 
achieve an overall atmospheric benefit. 
Therefore, there is a not only a need to police 
the rules of the mechanism, but also to 
periodically question and review whether the 
mechanism as a whole including all of its rules 
is making a real and meaningful contribution to 
mitigation.
As noted above, some actors also have the 
objective to facilitate the use of the mechanism
by countries with low domestic capacity.
Promotion of an equitable geographical
distribution of activities may therefore be 
another function to be performed. 
The current negotiating text also envisages 
other functions such as promoting public
awareness and facilitating dialogue. As these 
functions do not touch the core operation of 




























3 Division of Labour in 
Article 6.4 Governance
 Criteria for the Division of
Labour
The following section will develop a list of 
criteria to guide the discussion on which roles 
to assign to which actors. 
The controversy of whether to have a 
centralised or a Party-led system highlights that 
Parties have different criteria in their positions 
on how to design the new mechanism. As 
Schneider et al. note, there is a trade-off to be 
made. While centralised governance would 
facilitate comparability, consistency and
thereby a minimum assurance of 
environmental integrity, such a system might 
be less adaptable to local circumstances. By 
contrast, decentralised governance would allow 
to better reflect local circumstances, but run the 
risk of failing to ensure a minimum level of 
environmental integrity (Schneider et al. 2016).
The same consideration holds for the other 
objectives laid down in Article 6.1, raising 
ambition and promoting sustainable 
development.
Decentralised governance can nonetheless not 
be dismissed out of hand due to the strong role
Parties are to play in the implementation of 
Article 6. Article 6.1 stipulates that “Parties may 
cooperate”; this is a very different orientation 
compared to the Kyoto mechanisms (notably 
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation), where the host Parties often 
did not involve themselves very much in the 
implementation of measures.
As noted above, some actors also have the 
objective to facilitate the use of the mechanism
by countries with low domestic capacity. 
Another key distinction when deciding whether 
to have a centralised or a decentralised system
is administrative feasibility and transaction
costs. 
The paper will therefore use the following
criteria for the discussion of which roles to 
assign to which actors: 
• Achievement of the overarching





• Facilitation of participation for
countries with low capacity;




Given that no decision whatsoever has so far 
been taken on the role of the Body, it may be 
assigned vastly different roles, depending on 
what criteria to maximise for. At least four 
different prototypical models for the role of the 
Body may be envisaged:
• The Body could mainly be a "notary" - this is
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design of the mechanism toward the
criterion Party ownership
• At the other end of the spectrum, the Body
 	 

could be the "guardian of Paris objectives" -
this is the "centralised system" where all 
registrations and issuances are subject to
getting green light from the Body.

 An intermediate model is to have the Body•
act as "supervisor". This is the "dual
system", where Parties have the main role
in operating the mechanism but their
actions are supervised by the Body.
The Body may be made a "promoter of• 
 

mitigation and sustainable development". In
this role, the Body provides strong support
to promote activities in less developmed

 
countries, e.g. through top-down
development of methodologies.
  
The following will go through the functions 
needed to operate the mechanism and discuss 
what the governance of Article 6.4 could look 
like with each of these models.  
## " and Division of
Labour"
3.3.1 Accreditation of DOEs 
Options 
While in theory a Party-led model would not 
necessarily need to use DOEs, decision 1/CP.21 
clearly establishes that emission reductions 
need to be verified and certified by DOEs.
However, the decision does not specify who 
should have the competence to accredit the 
DOEs.
In the CDM, this function is performed by the 
CDM Executive Board. Similarly, the JI 
Supervisory Committee performs this function 
for JI Track 2. Under JI Track 1, Parties have had 
the option to accredit auditors nationally. 
In the “guardian” model, the Body and its 
support structure would perform this function 
similarly to the CDM Executive Board and to the 
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee.
The Body would establish accreditation 
requirements and assess whether applicant 
entities fulfil these requirements. Furthermore, 
the Body would monitor the quality of the 
DOE’s work and require re-accreditation at 
regular intervals.
However, doing the technical assessment work 
is beyond the capacity of the Body itself. In the 
CDM and JI Track 2 this work is therefore 
undertaken by the governing bodies’ support 
structure. Both the CDM Board and the JISC 
established accreditation panels for this 
purpose; a further strong role is played by the 
Secretariat. 
In the “notary” model, accreditation of DOEs 
would be left to the Parties. The Body could be 
mandated to make a list of all accredited DOEs 
publicly available. 
In the “supervisor” model, accreditation of DOEs 
would also be done by Parties, but the Body 
would define core requirements. These 
requirements would need to cover not only the 
qualification and performance of the DOEs but 
also the national accreditation processes of 
Parties. The Body would also need to have the 
mandate so suspend or even completely
withdraw the accreditation of DOEs if the 
Parties who accredited them are found to not 
comply with the quality requirements for their 
national processes.
A further option is a combination of Body 
accreditation, Party accreditation and use of 
other accreditation systems. For example, the 
Japanese-led Joint Crediting Mechanisms relies 
on entities accredited under the CDM or under 
ISO standard 14065 (Kachi, Sterk, and Tänzler 
2013). In this option, Body accreditation could 
effectively serve as backstop to make sure that 
a some number of accredited DOEs is available 



















mandated to make a list of all DOEs accredited 
by Parties or other systems publicly available. 
Discussion 
An advantage of a Party-led system could be 
that it would open Article 6 for entities that 
would not be otherwise able to participate in a 
centralised system. The unequal geographical
distribution of DOEs has been a concern under 
the CDM. This option would therefore maximise 
the criteria Party ownership and facilitation of
participation for countries with low capacity.
However, such an approach would raise 
concerns regarding achievement of the goals of 
the Paris Agreement. Without centralised 
accreditation and supervision, the quality of 
work of different DOEs might deviate 
substantially from each other. Differing quality 
levels have been a concern under the CDM, so a 
centralised system is no guarantee for 
comparable high-level quality. But nonetheless 
the chances of maintaining high quality are 
higher than under a decentralised system.
There is indeed an example of one DOE that 
performed normally under the CDM but had 
strong questions raised on its performance 
under JI Track 1 (Kollmuss, Schneider, and 
Zhezherin 2015).
The “supervisor” model would contain this risk 
to some extent. However, the supervision of 
national processes could hardly be as effective 
as the direct supervision of the DOEs 
themselves, especially if the Body is also not 
given a mandate to assess the individual 
activities. In such a setup, the Body would never 
have any direct contact with the work of the 
DOEs.
As for administrative feasibility and transaction
costs, operating an accreditation process 
requires substantial resources. It seems 
questionable how many individual Parties 
would make this effort. This hypothesis is 
underlined by the example of the Joint 
Crediting Mechanism (JCM) of Japan, which has 
no own accreditation system but uses CDM and 
ISO accreditation. Transaction costs would also 
be higher in the “supervisor” model due to the 
risk that the entirety of DOEs accredited by a 
country might be suspended or nullified if the 
national accreditation process of the country is
found to not adhere to the international quality 
requirements. 
At the same time, the resources for accrediting 
DOEs need to be mobilised somewhere. The 
administratively most feasible option therefore 
seems to be to mandate the Body with 
accrediting DOEs and to make Parties 
collectively responsible for funding this work.
3.3.2	 Methodology Development and 
Approval 
Options 
The demonstration of additionality,
establishment of baselines and development of 
monitoring plans requires some form of 
methodology. Under the CDM, project 
proponents have been able to develop 
methodologies, but these needed to be 
approved by the Executive Board. The Board 
and its support structure have also done some 
“top-down” methodology development and 
consolidation on their own. By contrast, under 
JI there are only criteria for baseline setting and 
monitoring, there is no requirement to have full
methodologies approved.
In the “notary” model, oversight of how to 
determine baselines and how to monitor 
projects would be completely left to Parties. In
the “supervisor” model, there could be 
international guidance on additionality,
baseline setting and monitoring which Parties 
would need to adhere to when approving 
activities, and the Body would have the 
mandate to ensure that Parties adhere to the 
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contain a separate step of national
methodology development and approval. If
there was such a separate step, the Body could 
supervise the national approval process.
Otherwise, it would be limited to supervising 
the national processes for the authorisation of 
activities (see next section). 
The “guardian” model would in principle work 
similarly to the CDM, but the content of this 
work might differ strongly. Under the CDM, the 
process of additionality demonstration,
baseline setting and monitoring gave raise to 
frequent complaints about its complexity and 
associated high transaction costs (CDM Policy 
Dialogue 2012). Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 
propose that BAU projections, one of the key 
determinants for the calculation of baselines, 
should be established and regularly updated 
internationally by the Body, not at activity level
(Michaelowa and Butzengeiger-Geyer 2017).
This would be a further step along the 
methodology standardisation process that was 
started under the CDM with the establishment 
of standardised baselines.  
A further question is what should be the role of
the Body and its support structure in relation to 
policy-based activities. While it was not possible
to register national policies under the CDM or 
JI, it is likely that this will be possible under Art.
6.4. The CDM Executive Board had substantial
difficulties dealing with policy-related 
questions. For example, it was unable to agree 
on a revision of its original decision that climate 
policies do not need to be taken into account in
baseline setting. It also failed to clarify whether 
national climate policies need to be taken into 
account in the demonstration of additionality 
(Cames et al. 2016).
It can be expected that in relation to Article 6 
such fundamental questions will also need to 
be answered by the Parties, not the Body.
However, if the fundamental question whether 
and how to take policies into account can be 
resolved by the Parties, there seems no reason 
why the Body could then not engage in the 
more technical work on developing 
methodologies to determine the additionality 
of policies and to quantify their mitigation 
impact.  
Finally, this function could also entail the 
development of methodologies and tools to 
assess whether and to what extent activities 
promote sustainable development, as called for 
in Article 6.1.
Discussion 
Again, leaving the questions of baseline setting 
and monitoring to Parties would maximise 
Party ownership of the mechanism, but at the 
expense of comparability and transparency, 
and thereby create the risk that the objectives 
of the Paris Agreement are not achieved.
Having a centralised methodology 
development would facilitate transparency and
comparability and thereby achievement of the 
Paris Agreement’s objectives. A centralised
process could also be particularly important to 
promote the participation of countries with low 
capacity. The Body could use this function to 
adapt methodologies to the needs of such 
countries. The CDM Board already did work in 
this regard, including top-down development 
of methodologies, development of 
standardised baselines and special rules for 
small-scale and micro-scale projects.
In the “supervisor” model, transparency and 
comparability would be greatly enhanced if 
there was a requirement to use approved 
methodologies. However, having each host 
Party have its own methodology approval
process would mean higher transaction costs. A 
centralised approval process under the Body 
would have lower transaction costs.  Having no 
requirement to use approved methodologies 
would mean no transaction costs for the 
approval process. But a lack of approved 

























activity design phase, and more work for 
Parties, DOEs and the Body when assessing 
activity proposals.
3.3.3	 Authorisation and Registration of 
Activities 
Options 
Activities will need to be authorised by the
Parties involved. Given the changed framework 
conditions under the Paris Agreement, host 
Parties will need to play a substantially more 
prominent role in activity approval than under 
the CDM. As they will have to account for any 
transfers, they will need to make sure that all 
activities on their territory are aligned with their 
NDCs and actually achieve additional emission 
reductions (assuming their NDCs are ambitious 
and built on robust data).
The question is whether there should in
addition be an international registration 
process with some form of assessment of 
proposals by the Body. Under the CDM and JI
Track 1, the Board and the JISC have the 
mandate to conduct reviews if there seem to be 
deficits in project proposals, and have the 
option to reject registration requests if the 
deficits are not remedied. Under JI Track 1,
there is no such international process; projects 
are only approved by the Parties involved.
The “guardian” model would follow the 
example of the CDM and JI Track 2. The “notary” 
model would follow JI Track 1, with the Body 
simply keeping track of the authorisation 
decisions made by Parties. In the “supervisor” 
model, the Body would have the mandate to 
supervise Parties’ national authorisation 
processes. However, for cases where a national 
process is found to be deficient, the Body 
would also need to have a mandate to review 
individual activities and to withdraw their 
registration if they are found to not conform to 
requirements.
Discussion 
Having no assessment function for the Body 
would maximise Party ownership. One may also 
posit that the validation of proposals by the 
DOEs would be sufficient to ensure 
environmental integrity (Bürgi et al. 2017). Not 
having an additional layer of scrutiny at Body 
level would also minimise transaction costs.
However, Parties with weak NDCs do not 
necessarily have an incentive to ensure the 
environmental integrity of Article 6.4 activities 
(Schneider et al. 2017; Hermwille and 
Obergassel 2018). Moreover, it is worth noting 
that the registration process has changed over 
the history of the CDM. At the beginning, the 
expectation was that validation of proposals by 
the DOEs would be sufficient and that reviews 
by the Board would be the exception. However,
over time the Board came to the opinion that 
the work of the DOEs was not sufficient. There 
was also criticism that these deficits were in­
built as the DOEs are hired and paid by the 
project proponents; critics therefore saw a 
systemic conflict of interest (Kreibich and
Fechtner 2013; Michaelowa and Buen 2012).
The Board therefore established additional
scrutiny by the Secretariat, a completeness 
check and an information and reporting check 
to determine whether the registration request 
is complete and contains all necessary 
information.
Again, a key question is whether the Body may 
have a role in assessing policy-based activities.
One may posit that such an assessment would 
infringe on the sovereignty of Parties. However,
use of Article 6.4 is voluntary, no Party is forced 
to make use of the new mechanism. Given the 
high risk that unsupervised transfers could 
result in transfers of ‘hot air’ (Schneider et al.
2017), one might posit that use of Article 6 
should be a privilege for Parties that are willing 
to subject themselves to international review.
Apart from the question of environmental
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have a flawless record in screening out projects 
with negative impacts on sustainable 
development. Accusations of severe human 
rights violations have been made on a number 
of projects (Obergassel et al. 2017). Having an 
international assessment of projects would 
facilitate achieving the sustainable 
development part of the Article 6.1 objectives. 
Having an international assessment of 
registration requests would entail higher 
transaction costs at this stage. However, 
without such an international process buyers 
may see a need to conduct their own 
assessment of the robustness of activities. No 
international assessment would therefore mean 
less transaction costs at the international level 
and on the side of activity proponents, but 




For the issuance of A6.4ERs there again is the 
question whether the Body should be involved 
in assessing whether the mitigation outcomes 
claimed by the project proponents have 
actually been achieved. Again, the mechanism
could follow the JI Track 1 model of no 
international assessment or the JI Track 2/CDM
model of having the Body and its support 
structure review and if necessary reject 
deficient issuance requests. 
In either case, the Body would have the 
function to execute issuances, even if it did not 
have a role in assessing them. 
A further questions is whether it is necessary of 
desirable for Parties to have a role in the 
approval of issuances. 
Discussion 
The arguments for whether or not the Body 
should have a mandate to assess issuance 
requests are essentially the same as for the 
question of registration requests.  Body scrutiny 
would mean a better guarantee of achieving 
the objectives of the Paris Agreement, higher 
transaction costs internationally and on the side 
of activity proponents, but possible lower 
transaction costs on the side of buyers. Ex-post 
scrutiny can be especially important for the 
sustainable development aspect of Article 6.1, 
as problems may become visible only during 
the implementation stage. 
Whether host countries should have a role in
approving issuances is a double-edged 
question. On the one hand, host countries need 
to make sure that issuances are aligned with 
their NDCs. On the other hand, requiring host 
country approval would give host countries the 
opportunity to rescind authorisation decisions 
through the back door and keep emission 
reductions for themselves. To minimise 
uncertainty and associated transaction costs, 
the role of host Parties should therefore 
arguably be limited to the authorisation stage. 




The question for this function is whether the 
Body should have the mandate to actively 
support the use of the new mechanism in
countries with low capacity. 
The Body could build on the work conducted 
under the CDM. The Board established a loan 
scheme to establish projects in
underrepresented countries. It also established 
regional collaboration centres in the Caribbean,
East Asia, and Western and Eastern Africa to 

















also established a mechanism  to financially 
support the development of standardized 
baselines in a particular country.
The Body could potentially also work as 
“matchmaker” between host countries and 
buyer countries, collecting proposals for 
activities from less developed countries and 
trying to stimulate interest among buyer 
countries.
Discussion 
Performance of this function is not so much a 
question of integrity, but rather of maximising 
participation for countries with low capacity.
The main question is therefore whether the 
Body should be endowed with the necessary 
resources to carry out this work. For the 
foreseeable future, such work would need to be 
funded by Parties.
3.3.6	 Strategic Review 
Options 
The modalities and procedures of the Kyoto 
mechanisms included provisions on scheduled 
reviews.  The CDM Executive Board and the JI 
Supervisory Committee contributed to these 
reviews by reflecting on their experience and 
providing recommendations. The CDM 
Executive Board even established a High-Level 
Panel of outside experts and commissioned a 
research programme in order to have a 
thorough reflection of future pathways for the 
mechanism (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012).
Conducting such reviews would be a part of
both the “supervisor” and the “guardian” 
model. By contrast, the “notary” Body would 
not exercise such a function.
Discussion 
Article 6 defines ambitious objectives but at the 
same time constitutes substantial trade-offs 
and perverse incentives. Instead of raising their 
ambition, host Parties may be tempted to keep 
their NDCs weak and inflate their emission 
baselines in order to maximise the amount of 
emission reductions they can sell. Acquiring 
Parties may be tempted to overly rely on the 
use of Article 6, neglecting domestic action and 
thereby locking in high-emission development 
pathways. Whether the CDM contributed to 
sustainable development has also been a 
matter of controversy. 
Regular strategic reviews of the performance of 
the Article 6.4 mechanism therefore seems 
called for in order to safeguard the 
mechanism’s contribution to the achievement 
of the Paris Agreements’ objectives. In this 
function, a strong role of the Body would 
arguably not conflict with the criterion of Party 
ownership, as any changes to the core rules of 
the mechanism would need to be adopted by 
the CMA. In addition to the core objectives of 
the Agreement, strategic reviews could also 
cover issues of geographical distribution and 
transaction costs. 
3.3.7	 Registry Development and 
Maintenance 
The Article 6.4 register is the core technical 
infrastructure needed to keep track of the 
activities registered under the mechanism and 
of the achievement and transfer of emission 
reductions. It is very likely that the Body and its 
support structure will have this function in any 
case, it will therefore not be discussed in further 
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       Table 1: Functions and Actors in the Operation of the Article 6.4 Mechanism
4 Discussion
This paper has aimed at elucidating what 
functions the Article 6.4 supervisory body could 
have. The paper elaborated on what steps the 
mechanism’s activity cycle will likely include, 
and on this basis discussed what functions the 
Body could have in each of the steps. The 
following table summarises what assignment of 
roles is possible and which assignments have 
already been decided. An ‘X” denotes that the 
Paris Agreement or Decision 1/CP.21 have 
already stipulated that an actor should have a 
particular role, while an ‘(X)’ denotes options 
that still need to be decided on.
This overview reveals the following aspects: 
• The role of the Body and its support
structure is generally not yet clear. There
has not yet been a decision on its role in
any of the functions.
• By contrast, the roles of Parties and DOEs
are already relatively clear.
• No responsibility has so far been assigned
for the functions DOE accreditation,
methodology development/approval,
geographical distribution and strategic
review.
Given that no decision whatsoever has so far 
been taken on the role of the Body, it may be 
























what criteria to maximise for. This paper has 
identified four prototypical models that could 
be followed. The below table illustrates the 
assignment of functions to the four models.
One ‘+’ denotes a small role whereas three ‘+’
denote a strong role.
It bears repeating that these are prototypical
models. Functions could also be combined 
differently.
While weighing the different criteria that speak 
in favour of the different models includes a 
degree of subjectivity, the authors consider that 
achievement of the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement should be the paramount criterion.
The history of in particular JI Track 1 has shown 
that environmental integrity may be breached 
severely without international oversight.
Schneider et al. found that the current NDCs 
contain a considerable amount of 2.2 to 3.5 Gt 
CO2-eq. of ‘hot air’ (Schneider et al. 2017). From
this perspective, the ‘notary’ model seems out 
of the question. 
Weighing the ‘guardian’ and the ‘supervisor’
models, the integrity of DOEs and the reliability 
and transparency of methodologies are 
particularly central pillars of maintaining
environmental integrity. If these functions are
centralised under the Body, one may consider 
dispensing with having the Body assess 
individual activity proposals and issuances.  
While the ‘notary’, ‘guardian’ and ‘supervisor’
roles are mutually exclusive, the ‘promoter’ is 
rather a complementary role which could be 
added to any other role. For example, even if 
the Body is only made a ‘notary’ in the 
operation of the activity cycle, it might still be
given the task to develop methodologies or to 
promote equitable geographical distribution of 
activities. 
Whatever role is chosen, the history of the 
Kyoto mechanisms shows that regular review of 
the operation of the new mechanism will be
crucial to safeguard its contribution to the Paris 
objectives. The risk of misuse by countries with 
low ambition looms large.
In addition to regular reflection by the Body,
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implementation of the Article 6.4 mechanism 
could also be examined under the Global
Stocktake. The process under the Global
Stocktake might have less of an insider 
perspective and might therefore be better able 
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